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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note will discuss the growing number of lawsuits against banks
involving customers who seek to recover funds after a theft occurs due
to perceived inadequate online authentication. As banking transac-
tions have moved from physical bank locations with vaults to the on-
line world, so have the criminals who threaten them. Most domestic
banks offer online banking with a Web browser, providing the same
services as a physical bricks and mortar bank branch. As banks move
services to an online accessible model, they face additional challenges.
With online banking, banks must provide reasonable security to pro-
tect customers' funds and accounts. This reasonable security includes
the processes and procedures that banks traditionally used to physi-
cally protect funds and methodologies to now protect against new
threats. If banks fail to implement reasonable online information se-
curity controls, losses to criminals will increase and customers will
hold banks accountable through the courts.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II of the Note concerns first,
traditional physical security expectations for banks; second, federal
regulations related to online banking; and lastly, online security ex-
pectations, particularly those based on federal guidance found in the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)l and Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council (FFIEC) Information Technology Exami-
nation Handbook. 2 Collectively, these areas establish the background
operating environment and duty of care for online banking authenti-
cation. Part III will then discuss three recent cases: Shames-Yeakel v.
* Bachelor of Arts, Biology, June 1997, University of Chicago; Juris Doctor, anticipated, May
2013, DePaul University College of Law. CISSP, (ISC)2.
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). See also Jolina C. Cuaresma, The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 497 (2002).
2. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EXAMINATION
HANDBOOK: E-BANKING, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/e-banking.aspx (last visited Feb.
23, 2012).
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Citizens Financial Bank,3 Patco Construction Company v. People's
United Bank,4 and Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica, Inc.,5 where the
plaintiffs in each case advanced negligence theories in an attempt to
recover funds lost after third party cyber crime. Part IV will analyze
the claims advanced in these cases and predicts that future plaintiffs
will succeed despite possible bank defenses. Part V will conclude that
even though the court considered the question of "commercially rea-
sonable security" settled in a contract in Experi-Metal, Inc., other suits
will likely succeed because banks must meet or exceed the minimal
standard of care for authentication to avoid liability to online banking
customers for theft.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CONFLUENCE OF ONLINE BANKING,
FEDERAL BANKING REGULATIONS, AND CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS
A. Banking Security Expectations in Physical and
Electronic Contexts
Consumers choose to place money in banks at least in part because
of the greater convenience and security that banks provide. 6 Federal
regulations indicate the need to encourage routine banking and sav-
ings.7 Banks have had to replicate many of the security procedures,
processes, and technologies that protect physical banks for the online
world.8 Traditionally, banks' focused their physical security on pro-
tecting real property stored in a vault.9 Theft and environmental loss
posed the greatest threat to stored physical funds.10 The standard for
reasonable security controls developed over time to address these and
3. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Il. 2009).
4. Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-CV-503-DBH, 2011 WL 2174507
(D. Me. May 27, 2011), aff'd sub nom Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United Bank, No 09-
503-P-H, 2011 WL 3420588 (D. Me. Aug. 4, 2011); Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United
Bank, No. 09-503-P-H, 2010 WL 1403929, at *4 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2010) (refusing to grant motion
for summary judgment).
5. Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 09-14890, 2010 WL 2720914 (E.D. Mich. July 8,
2010).
6. See Jon Newberry, 'Anytime, Anywhere, Anyway': Online Banking Offers Greater Conve-
nience and Easier Financial Planning, 82 A.B.A. J. 94 (1996). See generally Jinkook Lee & Julia
Marlowe, How Consumers Choose a Financial Institution: Decision-Making Criteria and Heuris-
tics, 21 brr'L J. BANK MARKETING 53 (2003) (finding that consumers value convenience most
when selecting a bank).
7. E.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified in
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
8. Eugene M. Katz & Theodore F. Claypoole, Willie Sutton is on the Internet: Bank Security
Strategy in a Shared Risk Environment, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 167 (2001).
9. Id. at 171-72.
10. E.g. fires, tornadoes, and hurricanes.
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involved perimeter defenses." Perimeter defenses limited access to
valuables, protected those valuables from harm, and also served a de-
terrent function.12
A medieval castle represents a classic analogy for a bank's perime-
ter defenses.'3 A castle's defenses addressed multiple threats includ-
ing direct attacks by cavalry, indirect attacks by archers, protracted
battles where the attackers attempt to starve the inhabitants, and bar-
rage by war machines such as catapults and ballista.14 Moving from
the outside in a castle had large fields, providing it with a 360 degree
view of the battlefield, a moat, thick castle walls, large towers, and
secure internal chambers.15 The layered physical defenses of a bank
are analogous to a castle. As one progresses from the parking lot of a
bank to a safe deposit box in a vault, the bank's defenses increase.16
Banks also rely on human interaction to provide authentication to
ensure that only legitimate customers access their funds.' 7 In a physi-
cal bank, the teller can ask the customer to provide a form of state-
sponsored identification, the teller can compare the picture to the cus-
tomer, and verify other characteristics such as handwritten signatures.
Other controls include requiring the use of pre-printed checks with
the account number, address verification, and using dollar amount
thresholds for transfers that require multiple signers.'8 The process of
authenticating customers is so routine that most people do not even
notice the numerous control points that go into a simple withdrawal of
funds from a checking account at a physical bank branch.
Customers comfortable with traditional bank security and human
interaction expect the same level of security when banking services
move online. This customer expectation helps set the basic features
and security controls for online banking. Consumers expect to per-
form routine banking from anywhere with anytime access via the In-
ternet. 19 Banks must continue to address traditional threats to funds,
while also meeting new challenges, especially in the area of authenti-
cation. 20 The routine processes and procedures for identifying cus-
11. See Katz & Claypoole, supra note 8, at 172-73 (including the use of bank vaults, security
guards, and other techniques minimizing theft and maximize detection).
12. Id. at 172 ("Protecting a treasure requires more than just thick walls.").
13. Id. at 171.
14. Id. at 172.
15. Id.
16. See Katz & Claypoole, supra note 8, at 172.
17. Id. at 173.
18. Id. at 175.
19. Id. at 177.
20. See id. at 175.
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tomers become more complex when many of the physical cues no
longer exist. For example, some banks have allowed customers to de-
posit checks with a camera-equipped cell phone.21 In this model, the
bank no longer has physical possession of the check or the person
attempting to cash the check. 22 Instead the bank must find substitutes
for traditional verification processes. To address this challenge, the
federal regulators have stepped in to provide guidance. In the ab-
sence of a market-driven trend, the regulators have helped level the
playing field by setting the minimum requirements for online banking,
specifically regarding authentication.
B. An Overview of Online Banking Regulations
The financial services sector falls under a complex web of federal
and state regulations designed to govern operations and customer in-
formation protection.23 At the highest level, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System sets the overall monetary policy for the
United States.24 The activities of a financial services company deter-
mine which regulatory body provides oversight.25 A bank will often
fall under several regulatory programs based on the bank's charter
and services it offers. 26 Different federal agencies regulate banks of-
fering traditional checking and savings accounts depending on the na-
ture of the bank's charter.27 Nationally chartered banks fall under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the
Comptroller for Currency (OCC).2 8 Credit unions and state chartered
banks fall under the review National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA). 29 The FDIC insures deposits held in traditional personal
checking and savings accounts.30
21. Method for Remote Check Deposit, U.S. Patent No. 20100082470 (filed Oct. 1, 2008),
available at 2010 WL 1243574.
22. Id.
23. AM. BAR Assoc., INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
GLOBAL EXECUTIVES, LAWYERS AND TECHNOLOGISTS 188-89 (Thomas J. Shaw ed., 2011).
24. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pflpf.htm (last updated Aug. 24, 2011).
25. Id. at 4-6.
26. See generally FFIEC, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND ORDERS, http://www.ffiec.gov/enforce
ment.htm (last updated Feb. 3. 2012) (discussing the various federal administrative agencies re-
sponsible for bank operation oversight).
27. See ABA, supra note 23, at 12.
28. Id.
29. See generally National Credit Union Administration, 12 C.F.R. § 701.1-701.39 (2010).
30. See generally Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950)
(codified in sections of 12 U.S.C. § 1811).
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The Federal Reserve maintains regulations that govern a bank's ac-
tivities.31 Federal regulations govern each type of bank account and
activities involved with banking transactions, for example, the Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act,32 referred to as Regulation E.33 These reg-
ulations, taken as a whole, govern most aspects of a bank falling
within the Federal Reserve System.
Of the many types of bank accounts, consumers often begin their
banking relationship with a basic checking account. The industry and
regulations define "consumer checking accounts" as "demand deposit
accounts."34 Demand deposit accounts represent a category that in-
cludes several noninterest-bearing accounts, including traditional
checking accounts.35 "Demand deposit" means "a deposit that is pay-
able on demand, or a deposit issued with an original maturity or re-
quired notice period of less than seven days." 36 The parties in the
three cases discussed in the next section each had funds in demand
deposit accounts with their respective banks.37
Regulation E governs online banking, which is the use of a com-
puter to initiate the electronic transfer of funds to or from a consumer
demand deposit account.38 The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System stated that
Regulation E provides a basic framework that establishes the rights,
liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund
transfer systems such as automated teller machine transfers, tele-
phone bill-payment services, point-of-sale (POS) terminal transfers
in stores, and preauthorized transfers from or to a consumer's ac-
count (such as direct deposit and social security payments). 39
Electronic funds transfer (EFT) involves the transfer of funds either
between consumer accounts (such as checking and savings accounts)
31. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 201.1(b) (2003).
32. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2010).
33. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2010) (pursuant to the Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2010).
34. Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions (Regulation D), 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(b)(1)
(i) (2010) (pursuant to authority granted by 12 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (2010).
35. Id. at § 204.2(b)(1).
36. Id.
37. Of note, only consumer demand deposit accounts are afforded protection under Regula-
tion E. Senators have proposed expanding the consumer protections of Regulation E to busi-
ness account holders. See discussion infra Part IV.
38. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.3.
39. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., REGULATIONS: COMPLIANCE GUIDE TO
SMALL ENTIIEs, http://www.federalreserve.govfbankinforeg/regecg.htm (last updated Oct. 4.
2011) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE GUIDE To REG. E]; see also 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
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or to pay bills.40 If an unauthorized fund transfer occurs, a bank
would only make a consumer liable for a maximum of fifty dollars, but
the failure to notify the bank in a timely fashion could result in a com-
plete loss. 4 1 The regulation attempts to strike a balance between the
bank's duty of care to protect an account and the customer's responsi-
bility to notice unusual activity. The questions of what constitutes an
unauthorized fund transfer and where the balance of responsibility
should lie will play a prominent role in the three cases later discussed
in Part III.
The preceding regulations set the foundation for the regulatory
framework that governs online banking for consumer checking ac-
counts. The regulations establish the standard of care for a bank that
offers online services and they also reflect reasonable general expecta-
tions for information security. The next section will cover the founda-
tions of reasonable consumer expectations for online banking security.
C. Federal Guidelines Establish Reasonable Online
Banking Security
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Stan-
dards further refined the Federal Reserve System regulations and es-
tablished the guidelines for information security for banks falling
under the authority of the OCC.42 These guidelines set minimum
standards for developing and implementing administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and in-
tegrity of customer information. 43 Of particular relevance here, each
bank must perform an assessment of "access controls on customer in-
formation systems, including controls to authenticate and permit ac-
cess only to authorized individuals" and then implement appropriate
controls. 44 The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) specifically established guidance for authentication in an on-
line banking environment.
40. EFT "refers to a transaction initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, com-
puter, or magnetic tape that instructs a financial institution either to credit or to debit a con-
sumer's asset account." See COMPLIANCE GUIDE TO REG. E, supra note 39.
41. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (2011).
42. Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 app.
B (2011) ("The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards (Guide-
lines) set forth standards pursuant to section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (section
39, codified at 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1), and sections 501 and 505(b), codified at 15 U.S.C. 6801 and
6805(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.").
43. Id. at (2)(B).
44. 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 app. B (3)(C)(1)(a).
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The FFIEC is an interagency council that assists with uniform prin-
ciples, standards, and reporting for the examination of financial insti-
tutions.45 The FFIEC InfoBase provides examination guidance to
financial institutions in the IT Handbook.4 6 The InfoBase contains
several booklets on topics including business continuity planning, on-
line banking, auditing, and payment systems.4 7 The booklets provide
guidance on the expectations of the regulatory agencies that perform
on-site reviews of financial services companies. 4 8 Due to develop-
ments in online banking, the FFIEC released guidance on federal reg-
ulator expectations for authentication. 49 The FFIEC released a
supplement to the 2005 FFIEC Guidance in June of 2011.50
The regulators developed the FFIEC Guidance to discuss improve-
ments in authentication technologies that might minimize the increas-
ing incidents of fraud.51 The recommendations apply equally to
consumer and business online banking. 52 As a matter of policy, the
agencies represented by the FFIEC no longer consider single factor
authentication as the only control mechanism to be adequate for high-
risk transactions involving access to customer information or the
movement of funds to other parties. 5 3 This means that the practice of
authenticating a customer using only a user name and password no
longer represents reasonable access controls when customers request
access to their online bank account. 54 Instead, banks should move to
the use of multiple factors to authenticate users.55 According to the
Guidance: "Existing authentication methodologies involve three basic
'factors': something the user knows (e.g., password, PIN); something
45. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., supra note 24, at 62.
46. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE, http://
ithandbook.ffiec.gov/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
47. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK INFOBASE: IT
BOOKLETS, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
48. Id.
49. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING EN-
VIRONMENT (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication-guidance.pdf [hereinafter
FFIEC GUIDANCE].
50. See generally FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, SUPPLEMENT To AUTHENTICATION
IN AN INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT (June 29, 2011), http://www.ffiec.gov/pdflAuth-ITS-
Final%206-22-11%20(FFIEC%2OFormated).pdf [hereinafter FFIEC SUPPLEMENT].
51. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON FFIEC
GUIDANCE ON AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT 2 (Aug. 15, 2006),
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication-faq.pdf; FFIEC Supplement, supra note 50, at 2.
52. FFIEC GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2-3.
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the user has (e.g., ATM card, smart card); and something the user is
(e.g., biometric characteristic, such as a fingerprint)." 5 6
Proper implementation of this Guidance requires the use of a factor
from two or more categories.57 The use of two factors from a single
category will not prove sufficient, for example, a bank that requires a
customer to submit a username, password, and an answer to a per-
sonal question such as the customer's mother's maiden name. The use
of these three factors (username, password, and mother's maiden
name) from the same category does not satisfy the guidance.58
Authentication methods that rely on more than one factor are more
difficult to compromise. While thieves might obtain a customer's
username and password using any number of techniques,59 the diffi-
culty of compromising an account goes up when a thief must compro-
mise another factor. For example, a bank that implements a two-
factor authentication system might require customers to provide their
username, password, and a six-digit number from a previously issued
physical token. The six-digit number expires either ten-minutes after
the bank issued it or after the customer uses it, whichever occurs
first.60 Thus, a thief would have to obtain all three pieces of informa-
tion in order to compromise the account.
While increasing security, the FFIEC counsel recognized that the
burden attached to implementing a multi-factor authentication pro-
gram, and that the level of authentication used in a particular applica-
tion, should be appropriate to the level of risk in that application. 61
This allows for a risk-based determination of particular controls. The
FFIEC guidelines acknowledge that the "legal appropriateness of any
particular authentication method (or any other security measure) is
not determined in the abstract." 62 The FFIEC guidelines also state,
56. Id. at 3.
57. FFIEC GUIDANCE, supra note 49, at 1.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Techniques may include technical (using keyloggers or other trojan horses) or traditional
social engineering (obtaining log on credentials via coercion and deceit).
60. Jim Bruene, Bank of America Launches SafePass, but You'd Never Know from Its Web-
site, NETBANKER (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.netbanker.com/2007/09/bank ofamerica_
launchessafepass-but not-mentioned-onwebsite.html ("The system ... sends users a 6-digit
code via text message. The code is then entered at BofA's website to authorize larger transfers,
new bill-pay merchants, new accounts for funds transfer, or to login from a new computer, not
previously 'registered' for online banking.").
61. FFIEC GUIDANCE, supra note 49, at 6.
62. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Where We're Headed: New Developments and Trends in the Law
of Information Security, 3 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L.J. 103, 117 (2007) [hereinafter
Smedinghoff I], available at http://www.edwardswildman.comlfiles/News/a58aea4d-61c6-4641-
83ad-Of73b7320464/PreviewlNewsAttachment/64d8c778-753d-4256-9a5d-10e9154d1151/Where
We'reHeaded -_NewDevelopmentsand Trends intheLawofInformationSecurity%20
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"What constitutes legally appropriate authentication may also change
over time as new threats arise and better technology is developed to
address them." 63
For example, Google now offers two-factor authentication for its
online applications including Google Mail, Google Documents, and
Google Reader." Google calls its new authentication scheme two-
step verification, making use of two factors: something the user knows
and something the user has.6 5 Users must supply their username and
password (something known), and also provide the verification code
that Google sent to the users' registered cell phone in a text mes-
sage. 66 Once authenticated, users may also establish the computer
they used to access Google Apps as trusted or untrusted. 67 The com-
puter then becomes the second, physical element of the authentication
process.
With Google offering this advanced feature set to protect e-mail
and other online applications, banking customers will increasingly
question why their banks do not offer similar protection. By avoiding
the time, expense, and difficulty of managing tokens, Google has en-
hanced the authentication process through common consumer devices
such as cell phones capable of receiving text messages via SMS.
Regulators also look to trends in technology when seeking to estab-
lish commercial reasonableness. 68 The notion of a reasonable authen-
tication standard will continue to evolve, spurred by the arms race
between criminals and businesses. Thieves will think up ever more
sophisticated methods of overcoming multi-factor authentication. The
definition of reasonable and legally appropriate authentication will
also grow to encompass ever more complex processes that may in-
clude previously unheard of technology.69
(Smedinghoff).pdf. See also Thomas J. Smedinghoff, It's All About Trust: The Expanding Scope
of Security Obligations in Global Privacy & E-Transactions Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1
(2007).
63. See Smedinghoff I, supra note 62, at 118.
64. Eran Feigenbaum, A More Secure Cloud for Millions of Google Apps Users, OFFICIAL
GOOGLE ENTERPRISE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2010), http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com/2010/09/
more-secure-cloud-for-millions-of.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See generally, FFIEC GUIDANCE, supra note 49 (discussing regulatory expectations and
notice of trends in commercial authentication technology); FFIEC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 50.
69. FFIEC GUIDANCE, supra note 49, at 8; see FFIEC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 50 (indicating
that the FFIEC released new guidance to update the 2005 materials); see also Tracy Kitten, New
Authentication Guidance Soon?, BANK INFO. SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.bankinfose-
curity.com/articles.php?artid=3282 (discussing the historical backdrop and expectations for the
FFIEC Supplement.)
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D. Summary of Background on Federal Regulation and Customer
Expectations for Online Banking
Banks must implement reasonable authentication methods that
meet or exceed the guidelines present in a variety of federal regula-
tions, and the FFEIC Guidance suggests options. These methods have
to not only address the federal regulations, but also meet customers'
expectations for the security of their funds stored at banks. The regu-
lations and customer expectations establish the baseline for online au-
thentication and when banks fail to meet this baseline, liability for loss
will probably attach.
III. OVERVIEW OF PERSONAL AND COMMERCIAL ONLINE
BANKING: CIVIL NEGLIGENCE CASES
Three cases, representing personal and commercial banking clients,
have sought civil recovery of lost funds under a tort negligence theory
accusing the banks of breaching their fiduciary responsibilities to pro-
tect customer accounts.
A plaintiff that files cases under this novel theory of liability gener-
ally includes four elements: first, that the bank provided online bank-
ing, including Automated Clearing House (ACH) transfers from a
checking account; second, a third party somehow gained access to the
online banking system and transferred funds out of the plaintiff's ac-
count without permission; third, the bank failed to provide notice to
the plaintiffs of unusual or suspicious activity; and lastly, the bank's
security measures did not prevent the fraudulent transfers.70
Liability may attach in either of two situations: first, under strict
liability situations where the bank fails to implement controls required
by Federal or State statutes; or second, under tort negligence where
the bank controls fall short of the "reasonable security" standard and
duty of care for online banking.
A. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Financial Bank
The plaintiffs in Shames-Yeakel, a couple with funds at the bank,
alleged that they lost $26,500 due to identity theft from their online
bank account.71 They alleged that the bank violated various statutes
and committed negligence in the design, implementation, and opera-
70. David Navetta, Online Banking and "Reasonable Security" Under the Law: Breaking New
Ground? (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2010/01/articles/reasonable-security/on-
line-banking-and-reasonable-security-under-the-law-breaking-new-ground/.
71. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
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tion of the online banking site.72 The Bank moved for summary judg-
ment and the court affirmed in part and denied in part.73
The judge dismissed the statutory negligence theory raised by the
couple under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).74 The judge
ruled that the account in question did not meet the standard of a de-
mand deposit account under Regulation D and thus the FCRA or
Regulation E did not apply to the account.75 This ruling foreclosed
the possibility of succeeding on the strict liability claim. If the plain-
tiffs succeeded on the FCRA claim, they could have pursued a strict
liability claim and avoided having to demonstrate the civil tort duty
element. Instead, the couple had to proceed with their complaint
under a general tort negligence claim.76
The judge allowed the general tort negligence claim to proceed and
held that a reasonable fact finder might determine that the Bank acted
negligently in protecting the couple's account.77 The court relied in
part on the Bank's duty to protect its customers and the Bank's failure
to implement the FFIEC Guidelines for Authentication in Internet
Banking; holding that the use of a single factor for authentication
(username and password) was insufficient and beneath what was com-
mercially reasonable for the time.78 Perhaps reflecting the sentiment
expressed in other FFIEC guidance, the judge noted that "[i]f this
duty not to disclose customer information is to have any weight in the
age of online banking, then banks must certainly employ sufficient se-
curity measures." 79
B. Patco Construction Company v. People's United Bank
In Patco, the plaintiffs alleged that Ocean Bank failed to adequately
protect customer funds against theft.8 0 The complaint alleged negli-
gence, breach of fiduciary duty, and raised a state statutory negligence
claim.81 Patco alleged that "[t]his action arises out of Ocean Bank's
failure to fulfill one of its most basic obligations, namely, to protect its
72. Id. at 996.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1007.
75. Id. at 1009.
76. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d. 994, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
77. Id. at 1009.
78. Id. at 1008-09.
79. Id. at 1008.
80. Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United Bank, No. 09-503-P-H, 2010 WL 1403929 (D.
Me. Mar. 31, 2010).
81. Id.
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customers' funds against theft."82 Following the same pattern as
Shames-Yeakel, criminals accessed Patco's account and transferred
hundreds of thousands of dollars to numerous bank accounts through
ACH.83 The complaint noted the "sophisticated systems" that Ocean
Bank advertised that it employed and also suggested that these sys-
tems proved insufficient. 84 The plaintiffs alleged a breach of the
Maine's State Statute.85 Similar to Shames-Yeakel, the plaintiffs pur-
sued a strict liability claim.
The next section will further discuss that the plaintiff survived a mo-
tion for summary judgment on the indemnification clause of the bank
agreement. 86 The bank raised a contract item as a possible defense to
the negligence claim.87 The Bank suggested that the agreement be-
tween the parties allowed them to waive a responsibility for the unau-
thorized transfer of funds.88 The court later affirmed the magistrate
judge's recommendation and granted the Bank's motion for summary
judgment: the court found that the record indicated that the Bank's
security was adequate.89
C. Experi-Metal Inc. v. Comerica, Inc.
In Experi-Metal Inc. (EMI), the plaintiffs alleged that Comerica
failed to prevent forty-seven fraudulent funds transfers from EMI's
commercial account. 90 Similar to the previous cases, the plaintiffs al-
leged that they did not authorize the funds transfers.9' This case
presented several interesting claims because it is the first to reach trial
and address a contractual agreement to determine whether the bank's
security was "commercially reasonable."
Comerica implemented token-based authentication where a "a user
accesses the Comerica Business Connect website by entering his or
her user ID, his or her confidential 4-digit PIN, and a six-digit code
82. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. People's United
Bank, No. 09-CV-00503, 2009 WL 4764707 (D. Me. Oct. 9, 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5-6 (citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11 § 4-1201).
86. See Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United Bank, No. 09-503-P-H, 2010 WL 1403929,
(D. Me. Mar. 31, 2010) (People's United Bank raised the indemnification clause as a defense to
liability).
87. See Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United Bank, No. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL 2174507, at
* 4-6 (D. Me. May. 27, 2011).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 2:09-cv-14890, 2010 WL 2720914, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. July 8, 2010).
91. Id. at *1.
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from a secure token." 92 The parties agreed that this secure token
technology "would be used to verify the authenticity of payment or-
ders and that this security procedure was commercially reasonable." 93
According to the governing state statute, "commercial reasonable-
ness" is a question of law that the court should determine by consider-
ing what the parties knew about routine banking transactions and
whether the parties agreed to the security procedure in writing.94 As a
result, the claims in EMI revolved around other negligence theories
surrounding the failure to monitor and warn the plaintiffs of suspi-
cious activities that the bank should have noticed.95
The court decided the case in June of 2011.96 The court noted that
"the person(s) who committed the fraud against Experi-Metal on Jan-
uary 22, 2009, obtained Experi-Metal's confidential information that
enabled the breach from an agent of Experi-Metal and that '[s]ection
440.4702, therefore is determinative of which party is responsible for
the loss at issue in this case . . . .' "97 The court affirmed its earlier
dismissal of a motion for summary judgment, stating that the Bank
satisfied the criteria under section 440 for consumer-initiated wire
transfer orders.98 The court found "no genuine issue of material fact
that Comerica and Experi-Metal agreed that the authenticity of pay-
ment orders would be verified pursuant to a security procedure and
that Comerica's security procedure was commercially reasonable."99
The court thus did not find occasion to comment on "commercially
reasonable security," instead disposing of the case on an analysis of
the UCC fair dealing doctrine. 00
IV. ANALYSIS: ESTABLISHING AN EXPANDED TORT NEGLIGENCE
CLAIM AGAINST ONLINE BANKS
Federal regulations and consumer expectations have established the
reasonable duty of care that a financial institution must follow for an
online authentication system that grants customers, whether personal
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *4.
94. MicH. Comp. LAWS § 440.4702(3) (2010).
95. See Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 2:09-cv-14890, 2010 WL 2720914, at *6-7
(E.D. Mich. July 8, 2010).
96. Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No 2:09-cv-14890, 2011 WL 2433383 (E.D. Mich.
June 13, 2011).
97. Id. at *1 (citing MicH. Comp. LAWS § 440.4702).
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at *14 ("This trier of fact is inclined to find that a bank dealing fairly with its cus-
tomer, under these circumstances, would have detected and/or stopped the fraudulent wire activ-
ity earlier. Comerica fails to present evidence from which this Court could find otherwise.").
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or business, access to perform electronic funds transfers. Generally,
when a criminal compromises an online authentication system, the
bank may be held financially liable for the resulting fraud. Traditional
tort negligence analysis, when applied to online authentication envi-
ronments, will likely result in banks' civil liability for loss when the
banks fail to implement recommended authentication procedures.
A. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Financial Bank
The issue with the plaintiffs' negligence claim is their argument that
Citizens breached its duty to sufficiently secure its online banking sys-
tem.101 A number of courts have recognized that fiduciary institutions
have a common law duty to protect their customers' confidential in-
formation against identity theft.102 The discussion of the FFIEC Gui-
dance bolstered the plaintiffs' claim. 03
The Jones rationale is inapplicable here, 104 however; Citizens did
not reimburse the plaintiffs' financial loss, so causation of economic
loss remains an issue for the fact finder. 0 5 The court stated, "Assum-
ing that Citizens employed inadequate security measures, a reasona-
ble finder of fact could conclude that the insufficient security caused
Plaintiffs' economic loss."106
The judge held that enough evidence existed to allow the case to
proceed to trial and denied Citizens' motion for summary judg-
ment. 07 At trial, the plaintiffs could have presented additional infor-
mation on the theories advanced in the complaint. The survival of the
motion for summary judgment marks an important milestone in this
sort of litigation. By establishing legal precedent, other trial attorneys
will point to the decision in Shames-Yeakel to support new negligence
claims. 08 Despite the parties choosing to settle, this case serves as an
important example of what authentication controls the courts consider
insufficient. Based on the Supplemental Guidance, a single factor is
no longer sufficient for high risk transactions.
101. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
102. See, e.g., Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1008 (N.D. 111. 2009)
(citing Jones v. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 835(HB), 2006 WL 1409492, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006)).
103. Id. at 1009.
104. Id. (citing Jones, 2007 WL 672091 (holding that a plaintiff had failed to establish causa-
tion of damages, where the defendant bank had reimbursed the plaintiff's monetary loss)).
105. Id. at 1009.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. At the time of press, over seventy court documents cited to Shames-Yeakel. See, e.g.,
Brief of Defendant-Appellees at *14 n.11, Karadimas, v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 10-4337-
cv, 2011 WL 2678143 (2d Cir. June 29, 2011).
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B. Patco Construction Company v. People's United Bank
Similar to Shames-Yeakel, a commercial account was the center-
piece of this case, which meant that the existing Regulation E protec-
tions for consumer accounts did not apply. Thus, the plaintiffs had a
more difficult burden of proof because they could not pursue a strict
liability claim. Unlike Shames-Yeakel, the state did not have an analo-
gous regulation to that of Michigan that would afford the plaintiffs a
strict liability cause of action. The bank used stronger authentication
questions, but appeared to lack the use of other anti-fraud controls as
discussed in the FFIEC Guidance. For example, the bank did not de-
ploy anomaly detection where the suspicious transactions might have
been flagged for further review.109 In an anomaly detection system,
the system develops a baseline of "normal" activity and flags devia-
tions from this pattern. For example, if Patco transferred funds
monthly to cover payroll, then the bank might have required that any
funds transferred that exceeded this usual threshold volume required
voice verification.
The surviving negligence claim parallels that of Shames-Yeakel.
The core issue rests on the duty of care that the bank should have
employed. Unlike the Michigan statutory definition of "commercially
reasonable" discussed in EMI,"i0 here the courts will have to decide
exactly what this means in context. The plaintiff's claim lies some-
where between the probably legally insufficient single password of
Yeakel and the "commercially reasonable" controls of EMI.
C. Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank
The EMI case establishes that the parties may define "commercially
reasonable" security controls in a contract, but does not provide com-
mon law guidance on what the courts may consider reasonable secur-
ity.11 ' The parties' agreement on commercially reasonable security
controls resembles the speed limit on a highway.112 A speed limit of
sixty-five miles per hour represents a reasonable speed during ordi-
nary weather conditions, but cars should travel at slower speeds dur-
ing a thunderstorm.'1 3 The standard established in EMI represents a
109. See also Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation,
16 C.F.R. § 681 app. A, supp. A(21), 72 Fed. Reg. 63,771 (as amended by 74 Fed. Reg. 22,646)
(2011) (indicating that when "[a] covered account is used in a manner that is not consistent with
established patterns of activity" the bank must notify the customer).
110. See supra 92-95.
111. Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 09-14890, 2011 WL 2433383, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
June 13, 2011).
112. See AM. BAR Assoc., supra note 23, at n.44.
113. Id.
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contractually agreed upon threshold for reasonable security by hold-
ing the parties may define the term "commercially reasonable" via
contract. Banks, like drivers on the road, may choose to take addi-
tional actions if external conditions warrant additional caution.
While the court resolved the question of what is commercially rea-
sonable in reliance on the contract, the ruling still serves as an exam-
ple of what the courts will consider reasonable security controls in
other contexts without a pre-established contractual basis. 114 The
court, by evaluating the language of the contract, found that the un-
derlying security measures discussed represented a reasonable
standard."15
EMI attorney Richard B. Tomlinson commented at the conclusion
of the trial, "If Comerica had some simple technology in place to
score" anomalies and take action, "those transactions would have trig-
gered an alert."116 He correctly indicated that the court would rule on
reasonable fair dealing and not commercially reasonable security.
While the case established that token-based authentication might pro-
vide a "commercially reasonable" solution to the authentication prob-
lem, the plaintiff continued to allege that the security measure the
bank employed did not provide a reasonable level of security for on-
line banking in terms of fraud monitoring. In light of several recent
developments in computer crime (discussed in the next Part), the
plaintiff may have a point.
D. Potential Bank Defense Claims and Federal Response
Banks will continue to attempt to minimize their liability in two
ways: through the use of contractual language and by applying excep-
tions that exist in federal law. Banks might attempt to avoid liability
through the gist of the action doctrine, contract provisions, and con-
tributory negligence affirmative defenses.
Banks as defendants can not rely on the "gist of the action" doc-
trine. This doctrine "is designed to maintain the conceptual distinc-
tion between breach of contract claims and tort claims" and precludes
"plaintiffs from recasting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort
claims."' 17 The doctrine only applies when the relationship between
114. Experi-Metal, Inc, 2011 WL 2433383 at *1.
115. Id.
116. Tracy Kitten, EMI, Comerica Await Verdict, BANK INFO SECURITY (Jan. 28, 2011), http://
www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?artid=3304&pg=1 (quoting Richard B. Tomlinson,
EMI attorney).
117. Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 541, 550 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).
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the parties exists solely by contract; the gist of the action doctrine does
not bar a tort claim where there exists a duty in addition to the con-
tract.118 The duty of a bank to protect customer's funds extends from
customer expectations and federal regulations. 119 Thus, any attempt
by a bank to apply the gist of the action doctrine based purely on the
existence of a contract between the parties will fail. Banks face state
and federal statutory requirements, along with contractual obligations
to protect customer's accounts. Therefore, customers have multiple
grounds upon which to rest a complaint that includes tort and contract
claims.
Uniform Commercial Code section 4A-202 sets out the relevant
standard for security procedures related to payment orders in con-
tracts.120 In this section of the UCC, the code allows the parties to
contract for automated payments provided that the bank employs a
"commercially reasonable method of providing security against unau-
thorized payment orders" and that the bank accepts the payment or-
der in good faith and in compliance with the contracted process.121
The code has an ambiguous definition of a security procedure.122 Still,
the Federal Trade Commission has successfully brought actions
against companies for security breaches based in part on similar defi-
nitions of commercially reasonable security measures.123 For a bank
to avoid liability for fraudulent transfers, the parties must follow an
agreed upon security procedure.124 The existence of lawsuits in this
area indicates that the industry, consumers, and judges can reasonably
disagree about what constitutes "commercially reasonable." Banks
will likely attempt to follow the model established by EMI where the
contract with the customer indemnifies the bank for loss to avoid the
current ambiguity.
Banks also attempt to minimize their obligations by requiring the
consumer to use reasonable information security practices and proce-
dures by way of contract. Buried within the terms of service for on-
line banking services, customers must often implement several
118. Niagara Mohawk Power Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 725 F. Supp. 656, 668
(N.D.N.Y. 1989).
119. See supra Part II.
120. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) (2005).
121. Id.
122. U.C.C. § 4A-201 (2005) ("'Security procedure' means a procedure established by agree-
ment . . . for the purpose of (i) verifying that a payment order or communication amending or
cancelling a payment order is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission ...
of the payment order or communication.").
123. FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
124. See, e.g., Hedged Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Norwest Bank Minn., 578 N.W.2d 765, 773 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998).
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additional programs to protect their systems.125 Banks often require a
personal firewall, antivirus software, and secure Internet access.126
The implementation of these controls requires additional hardware
and software configuration, resulting in only the most sophisticated
consumers having the required protections in place. By placing a high
level of responsibility for security software on the consumer, the
banks might arrive at a situation where few consumers can achieve the
base level of security. The terms of service often require these sophis-
ticated steps before the bank assumes liability.127
Banks also avoid negligence claims by requiring consumers to agree
to terms that recognize that the information security measures the
banks already employ are "commercially reasonable." Comerica did
not have an unusual Term & Conditions agreement, and now that a
court has ruled on the terms of the agreement in one jurisdiction,
other banks will likely impose similar terms. This may have the effect
of minimizing the implementation of stronger controls. Regulations
such as GLBA merely require the implementation of "commercially
reasonable" information security controls.128 Should banks satisfy this
requirement in contractual agreements versus enhanced security con-
trols, innovation and overall security will suffer. Since this flaw leaves
the banks with power to decide what measures to implement, federal
regulators may wake up to this threat. Guidance and regulation for
banking will have to become more prescriptive.
While private citizens may continue to pursue FDIC reimbursement
from the banks under Regulation E, commercial parties such as Patco
and EMI will not be able to recover under this existing Federal
regulation.129
Federal regulators may follow the established model created and
drafted into law for health care providers in the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).130 HIPAA established
privacy and security guidance for Covered Entities when accessing,
storing, handling, processing, or disposing of Protected Healthcare In-
125. Bank of America - Bank of America Online Banking Security Check, FRAUDWATCH
INT'L, http://www.fraudwatchinternational.com/phishing/individual-alert.php?fa-no=238989&
modealert (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). See also CitiBusiness Online: Security and Accountability
Solutions, Crn BANK, http://www.citibank.com/us/citibusinessonline/securitytoken.htm [herein-
after CitiBank Online Safety Guide] (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
126. Citibank Online Safety Guide, supra note 125.
127. Id.
128. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 508, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
129. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2010).
130. H.I.P.A.A. Enforcement Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,895 (Apr. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 160).
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formation (PHI). 131 After the initial adoption of the act, Congress
clarified the security provisions and commented on "reasonable infor-
mation security controls" with accompanying commentary in the Fed-
eral Register. 132 In response to the challenges in the banking industry,
Congress may follow this same approach.
Should these other methods fail to avoid litigation, banks may raise
a contributory negligence tort claim. As testified to in Patco133 and
alleged in EMI, the criminals must have obtained the customer
username and password (credentials) in some fashion. Criminals may
have obtained access to the online systems through brute force guess-
ing (i.e. trying every possible variant of a password via a specialized
script), but more often criminals obtain valid credentials from another
avenue. Social engineering or phishing rely on the victims' gullibility
and trick them into divulging their credentials. Criminals may also
install malware on the computer to capture credentials that victims
type in to authenticate their identity on a website. Regardless of the
method, a criminal obtains the victims' credentials through some ac-
tion or inaction on the part of the victims. Banks could use this action
or inaction to establish that the customers negligently contributed to
the loss of funds.
The provisions in existing contracts regarding browser software,
personal firewalls, and antivirus software establish the baseline expec-
tations of a bank. Should a customer lack one or more of these con-
trols, the bank could raise an affirmative defense. Case law does not
appear to exist on this point, since most customers have settled their
claims against banks. However, some case law does exist regarding
contributory negligence and traditional check fraud. 134 If more cases
proceed to trial, then courts might expand the scope of the contribu-
tory negligence doctrine. However, the recently released supplement
to the FFIEC Authentication Guidance may change this balance.
E. New FFIEC Authentication Guidance Released
The FFIEC circulated a draft document entitled "Interagency sup-
plement to Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment" for
131. Id.
132. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules, 75 Fed. Reg.
40,868, 40,916 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. pt. 164).
133. Patco Const. Co., Inc. v. Peoples United Bank, No 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL 3420588 (D.
Me. Aug. 4, 2011).
134. See Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, 636 F.2d 1051,
1056-57 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981) (holding that a bank could raise a contributory negligence
defense against a payor).
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comment by member agencies 35 and later released the final Supple-
mental Guidance.136 The FFIEC Supplement focuses on four areas:
* Better risk assessments to help institutions understand and re-
spond to emerging threats, including man-in-the-middle or man-
in-the-browser attacks, as well as key loggers;
* Layered security that provides both widespread use of mul-
tifactor authentication, especially for so-called "high-risk" trans-
actions and fraud detection;
* More effective monitoring and reporting including audit fea-
tures, multiple control features to authorize fund transfers, and
independent review of security and fraud prevention programs;
* Heightened customer education initiatives, particularly for com-
mercial accounts.' 37
These updates should not come as a surprise based on the EMI case
or developments in online fraud tools such as Zeus.138
Zeus serves as one example of the new breed of man-in-the-middle
attacks that may upset the balance between shared responsibilities for
fraud losses.139 The user accidentally installs the Zeus Trojan Horse
by clicking on a web page link or downloading pirated software.140
Once installed, Zeus waits for the user to log onto a bank website and
steals the authentication credentials.141 Additionally, Zeus tricks the
user into supplying additional information by substituting HTML
code for page elements from the bank.142 By doing so, Zeus may steal
user PIN or one-time-use token-generated passwords.143 Zeus then
sends these credentials to criminals who use them to perpetuate addi-
tional fraud.144 Even more worrisome, approximately 3.6 million U.S.
machines carry this infection and antivirus software does not detect
most variants.145 Current protection technologies do a poor job of
protecting users against attacks such as Zeus.146 The draft FFIEC gui-
135. Tracy Kitten, First Look: New FFIEC Guidelines, BANK INFO SECURYY (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art id=3374.
136. See generally FFIEC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52. Scott Fryzel, The FFIEC's Supplement
to Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment, 128 BANKING L.J. 827 (2011) (providing
general background on the FFIEC Supplement and prior cases).
137. Id.
138. Dan Goodin, Word's Nastiest Trojan Fools A V Software, THE REGISTER (Sept. 18, 2009,
12:37 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/09/18/zeusevades-detection/.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Trusteer, Measuring the in-the-wild Effectiveness of Antivirus Against Zeus, (Sept. 14,
2009), http://www.trusteer.com/files/Zeus-andAntivirus.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Goodin, supra note 138.
145. Id.
146. Id.
CIVIL LIABILITY IN ONLINE BANKING
dance provides additional measures that, if adopted by banks, would
mitigate some of the risk. 147 The FFIEC Supplement calls on banks to
address man-in-the-middle attacks by relying on multifactor authenti-
cation and back-end anomaly detection systems. 148
As the legal and criminal spheres have advanced, the federal guide-
lines provided to banks must also evolve. The FFIEC Supplement
highlights the need for banks, being the party with access to informa-
tion about "normal" account activity, to put in place systems designed
to "detect anomalies and effectively respond to suspicious or anoma-
lous activity."1 49 Another aspect of the guidance suggests the use of
layered controls, analogous to the castle perimeter defense model dis-
cussed in Part 11.150 Banks may implement "out-of-band verification
for transactions"1 51 or "policies and practices for addressing customer
devices identified as potentially compromised" by a Trojan or other
malware.152 Complex device identification systems could move be-
yond simple Internet Protocol Address (IP) to interrogate the end-
user computer for details such as processor type, memory, installed
browser, and in the mobile space, unique mobile handset identifiers
combined with geo-location.153 The combination of these techniques
might better secure online accounts against attackers.
More importantly, the new FFIEC Guidance shifts the balance for
protecting consumers back towards banks. By recognizing that per-
sonal consumer protections, such as antivirus software, provide lim-
ited protection against threats, the FFIEC has tacitly recognized that
banks must do more to protect consumers. The courts will likely fol-
low the advice of the FFIEC and alter the courts' analysis of the duty
of care for banks. "'Security is a shared responsibility,' Johnson, Risk
Management Vice President, says. 'Responsibility for secure transac-
tions resides at both the business and consumer [sic], as well as at the
financial institution.'"1 54 Expanding Regulation E to commercial ac-
147. Kitten, supra note 135.
148. Id.
149. FFIEC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 50, at 5; see also id. at 4 ("[F]raud detection and moni-
toring systems that include consideration of customer history and behavior and enable a timely
and effective institution response.").
150. Id.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id. at 5.
153. See FFIEC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 50, at 6.
154. Linda McGlasson, Should Banks Be Liable for Business Losses to Fraud?, BANK INFO
SECURITY (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.phpartid=2390 (quoting
Doug Johnson, Risk Management Policy Vice President, American Bankers Association). See
also Larry Lawrence & Bryan D. Hull, Risk of Loss for Unauthorized Funds Transfers, 2 PAY-
MENT SYs., § 14:30 (2011).
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counts would expand the coverage provided by statute and further
push the balance towards banks to protect both types of checking ac-
counts. 155 The current regulations attempt to balance responsibility
for protecting funds between the bank and the consumer. 156
V. CONCLUSION: BANKS' LIABILITY FOR ONLINE THEFT DUE TO
INSUFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION
Following the FFIEC release of the supplemental guidance, courts
will still find in favor of banks that employ statutory minimum authen-
tication protections present in current federal and state laws. Plain-
tiffs will attempt to recover under strict liability and traditional
negligence claims. Plaintiffs will point to evolutionary authentication
schemes similar to those made available by Google for e-mail and on-
line tools to sway the balance against what the banks might consider a
commercially reasonable authentication. If Google can afford this
level of protection for e-mail, banks will struggle to explain why they
did not make a similar investment to safeguard financial information.
The problems of assigning liability in tort negligence cases are not
new. Courts have long struggled with the proper balance between a
bank's negligence and a customer's contributory negligence. These
customer actions include selecting poor passwords, installing malware
such as keyloggers that record typing, and a failure to implement
freely available security software.157 The FFIEC Supplement seems
to point towards regulators assigning greater responsibility on the
banks. The courts will follow this direction and increasingly hold
banks liable. Banks must implement the current Guidance and Sup-
plement. Even if the courts did not hold the banks liable for negli-
gence in the three cases above, future courts will hold other banks
liable for insufficient information security controls. These three cases
are the mine canaries that indicate the direction that future lawsuits
will pursue. The state of the definition of "commercially reasonable"
protections will continue to evolve, with the FFIEC Supplement serv-
ing as the new baseline.
155. See McGlasson, supra note 154.
156. See supra Part II.
157. Keylogger software surreptitiously records the users key strokes and forwards along user
names and passwords to an attacker.
